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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
MARY JEAN JOHNSON, : Case No. 20070280-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Forgery, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003); and Possession of a Forgery Device, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (2003); and Falsely 
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) 
(2002). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment).1 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point I. Where a presentence report recommends probation, does a trial court 
abuse its discretion when it imposes consecutive sentences relying on improper factors 
1
 A copy of the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment from both of the cases is included 
in Addendum A. 
and failing to consider the mandated factors required by Utah law. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "'An abuse of discretion 
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the 
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1991). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 116:3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following relevant provision is provided in full in Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is a consolidation of the two following cases: On October 28, 2005, in 
case number 051907686 (686), Ms. Johnson was charged by Information with Falsely 
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (2003) and Theft by Deception, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003). (R. (686): 1-3). On July 
21, 2006, in case number 061904772 (772), Ms. Johnson was charged by Information 
with two counts of Forgery, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501 (2003); one count of Theft by Deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003), nine counts of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third 
2 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (2003); and one count of 
Attempted Theft by Deception, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405. (R. (772): 1-6). 
On November 27, 2006, Ms. Johnson entered a guilty plea to one count of Falsely 
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony. (R. 
(686): 100, 102-108). During the same hearing, Ms. Johnson also entered guilty pleas to 
one count of Forgery, a third degree felony and Possession of a Forged Writing, a third 
degree felony. (R. (772):69-70; 76-82). A presentence report was ordered and prepared 
for sentencing purposes. R. 123. 
On March 19, 2007, the trial court imposed three indeterminate terms of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively. R. 116:5; see also (R. 
(686): 124-25; (772):95-98). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 27, 2006, Ms. Johnson entered a guilty plea to one count of Falsely 
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony. (R. 
(686).T00, 102-108). During the same hearing, Ms. Johnson also entered guilty pleas in 
case number 772 to one count of Forgery, a third degree felony and Possession of a 
Forged Writing, a third degree felony. (R. (772):69-70; 76-82). A presentence report was 
ordered and prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 123. 
On March 19, 2007, a sentencing hearing was held for both cases. R. 116. During 
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the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should follow the 
presentence report's recommendation for probation and parole for Ms. Johnson. R. 
116:3. The presentence report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P) 
recommended that Ms. Johnson serve 36 months of supervised probation with the 
following special conditions: 
(1) Serve 240 days in the Salt Lake County Jail; (2) Successfully complete a 
substance abuse evaluation within 30 days of release from custody, and 
comply with treatment as directed by AP&P; (3) Obtain a mental health 
assessment within 30 days of release from custody, and comply with 
treatment as directed by AP&P; (4) Take medication as prescribed, to be 
monitored at the discretion of the AP&P; (5) Not use or possess illegal 
drugs or alcohol, nor frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale; 
(6) Pay a fine of $925.00 in each case, which includes the surcharge; (7) 
Pay a court security fee of $50.00; (8) Have no contact with the 
codefendant, unless otherwise approved by AP&P; (9) Enter and 
successfully complete the Adult Basic Education program at the Day 
Reporting Center and obtain a G.E.D. or high school diploma as directed by 
AP&P. Upon proof of completion it may be recommended that [Ms. 
Johnson] have $250 credited to her fine; (10) Pay restitution in the amount 
of $161.16 in case # (686), and any other legitimate claims submitted in 
these cases. 
R. 123:1-2. 
The presentence report investigator stated that "recommendations have been made 
to address public safety issues, as well as Ms. Johnson's needs, and it was determined she 
is an appropriate candidate for the privilege of supervised probation." R. 123:3. In 
support of Ms. Johnson and in offering her a place to live, Ruth Evans wrote the 
following letter: 
My name is Ruth Evans, my husband is Roger Evans, we are living in 
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Mapleton, Utah. We have know[n] Mary Jean Johnson for five years. She 
and my son John M. Bayson were living in our house for some time. Now, 
I'm 68 years old and I'm sick. So, if she wants to come to our house, she's 
very welcome and very greatfull [sic]. 
R. 123. 
Defense counsel argued that Ms. Johnson's "life has been a pitiful rendition from 
childhood on." Ms. Johnson has "been abused emotionally and physically . . . [and has] 
never had . . . [a] place to live for long periods of time." R. 116:2. The trial court stated 
that "[i]f we put her in prison for a long time it would give her a place to live." R. 116:2. 
The trial court then stated that "[i]t's not just that she doesn't have a place to live. She 
keeps committing the crimes." R. 116:2. Defense counsel argued that incarceration has 
"not seemed to be of any positive import to Ms. Johnson" and noted that Ms. Johnson 
"has been on mental health medication." R. 116:2. Defense counsel asked the court to 
follow the recommendation of AP&P of probation and giving credit for time served. R. 
116:3. The trial court then stated 
[I]t troubles me [Ms. Johnson] says she wants to live with Ms. Evans down 
in Mapleton, this is an elderly sick person. She has a pattern of taking 
advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their 
credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim 
waiting for the next crime. 
R. 116:3. 
The prosecutor stated that he believed that Ms. Johnson deserved to go to prison 
and would give Salt Lake County citizens a "reprieve^ from her criminal conduct." R. 
116:3-4. Defense counsel argued that he did not "know if the penitentiary is a place for 
5 
someone with the mental problems and emotional problems that [Ms. Johnson's had]." 
R. 116:4. 
The trial court imposed Ms. Johnson's sentence of three indeterminate terms of 
zero to five years in prison to be served consecutive to each other. R. 116:5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences 
without considering all of the statutory factors mandated when imposing a sentence for 
more than one felony offense. The presentence report requested and prepared on Ms. 
Johnson considered all of the statutory factors and recommended probation. Instead of 
following the presentence report's recommendation or explaining why it was deviating 
from that recommendation, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences citing only to 
her criminal history and stating that if the court puts Ms. Johnson "in prison for a long 
time it would give her a place to live." The trial court's failure to consider the mandatory 
factors before imposing consecutive sentences and reliance on an improper factor in 
support of its drastic deviation from the presentence report was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RELYING 
ON AN IMPROPER FACTOR TO DRASTICALLY DEVIATE FROM THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATION OF PROBATION 
AND IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS. 
A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge 
in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive 
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sentence.'"5' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997). A trial court abuses its 
discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant [sentencing] factors,'" State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate 
weight to certain mitigating circumstances."5 State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ [15, 40 P.3d 
626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). This Court will find a trial 
court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take 
the view adopted by the trial court.55 Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotation omitted). 
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address 
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more than one 
felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, T|48, 52 P.3d 451. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-401 (2003), outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a trial court is 
mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposes concurrently 
or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent sentences are 
favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^43. (citations omitted). 
Section 76-3-401 states in part the following: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; . . . 
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(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) - (2). 
A presentence report which contains detailed information regarding these statutory 
factors can assist a trial court in exercising its discretion properly. See Helms, 2002 UT 
12 at *f 13. This is because a "presentence report contains detailed information regarding 
not only the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' but also the 'history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'" Id. In Helms, the supreme court determined 
that although a trial court's sentencing order may not "state to what extent it considered 
each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing" a trial court's review of the 
presentence report evidences that a trial court considered the relevant statutory factors 
necessary. Id. 
This Court has stated that when a trial court deviates from the recommendations of 
AP&P without explanation and imposes consecutive sentences without record evidence to 
indicate that all of the statutory factors had been considered, an abuse of discretion 
occurs. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^|48. Furthermore, an abuse of discretion will be 
found if the defendant can "clearly show[] that the trial judge would have granted 
probation except for some wholly irrelevant, improper[,| or inconsequential 
consideration." State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957). 
In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated burglary, a first degree 
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felony and attempted murder, a second degree felony. Id. at •pO. On appeal, Perez 
argued, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive prison 
terms without considering all of the required statutory factors. Id. at [^42. The 
presentence report prepared for Perez had recommended that he serve concurrent prison 
terms and the prosecutor had agreed with that recommendation. Id. at |^44. In imposing 
sentencing, the trial court noted that it had heard the evidence and found that Perez's 
conduct in committing these offenses was "egregious." Id. at 45. After briefly touching 
on the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" the trial court sentenced Perez to serve 
his terms of imprisonment consecutively. Id This Court determined that "[t]he trial 
court's brief commentary dealt only with the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' 
and did not explicitly address the presentence report's recommendation of concurrent 
sentences." IcL at ^48. Nothing in the record indicated that the trial court '"considered] 
the . . . history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
As seen in Perez, trial courts often focus their sentencing decisions based on their 
consideration of the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" alone and often fail to 
adequately evaluate the other statutory factors. Often an abuse of discretion can be found 
because of a trial court's failure to consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant. For 
example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) (Smith II), the defendant was 
convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of sodomy on child. 
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Id at 238. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences because the crimes were 
heinous, the defendant was a pedophile, and although the defendant's own victimization 
as a child was a mitigating factor, he was responsible to get help for himself. Id, at 244. 
Our supreme court held the sentence was an abuse of discretion because the trial court 
ignored the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id. at 244-45. 
An additional and highly important factor in deciding whether to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences is that the Legislature, in enacting 
indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons wide 
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be. State v. Strunk, 
846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The Board is in a far better position than 
a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress 
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence 
accordingly. While the trial court imposed the greatest minimum 
mandatory sentences possible under the law, and justifiably so, we think it 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a 
minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons 
of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and possible 
progress toward rehabilitation. 
Id at 244-45 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Galli, the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated 
robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years before being sentenced. See 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Our supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion by 
ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) although the defendant's crimes were 
serious, the record showed the trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any 
physical injuries," only used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of 
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money; (2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one 
misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal 
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's 
"offenses and flight from justice reflected] negatively on his character," he "voluntarily 
confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and hope to improve 
himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a 
productive individual"; and (4) concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his 
"rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from 
prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at 
938; see Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02 (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 
16-year-old convicted of murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to 
consecutive sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of 
imprisonment" because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a minimum 
of twenty-four years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative 
needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and 
"rob[bed] the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner"). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by drastically deviating from the 
presentence reports recommendations of probation. Instead, the trial court imposed 
consecutive sentences by relying on improper factors to support its deviation and failing 
to consider the required statutory factors. See Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393 (trial court fails to 
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properly exercise its discretion when it is clear that probation was denied because of 
"some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration"). The presentence 
report investigator noted that "[i]n staffing this case, recommendations have been made to 
address public safety issues, as well as Ms. Johnson's needs, and it was determined she is 
an appropriate candidate for the privilege of supervised probation." R. 123:3. The 
presentence report detailed the "gravity and circumstances" of Ms. Johnson's offenses, 
her history, character and rehabilitative needs. Id. 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed concern over Ms. Johnson's 
"accelerating [criminal] record." R. 116:2. Defense counsel explained that her criminal 
record was indicative of Ms. Johnson's history of suffering emotional and physical abuse 
as well as being homeless for long periods of time. R. 116:2. Because of Ms. Johnson's 
history, defense counsel argued that incarceration has not shown to be "a curative for her 
ills" or to have "any positive import" on her. R. 116:2. The trial court then stated that 
"[i]f we put her in prison for a long time it would give her a place to live." R. 116:2. The 
trial court then added "[i]t's not just she doesn't have a place to live. She keeps 
committing the crimes." R. 116:2. The trial court also expressed concern regarding the 
family Ms. Johnson was planning on residing with upon her release, stating: 
It's just, it troubles me she says she wants to live with Ms. Evans down in 
Mapleton, this is an elderly sick person. She has a pattern of taking 
advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their 
credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim 
waiting for the next crime. 
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R. 116:3. 
T-1*1 • \ s , v / J • ! • ! . . : • -JL- .i:.iCici.-im:iLc prison terms of 
zero to five years, to be served consecutively. R. 116:5. Other than to cite to K Is 
Johnson's criminal record, the trial court, like the one in Perez, failed to explain or 
auaress air, vi i;ie SLuiiiiorily required factors that led it to its drastic deviation from the 
presentence ixcomrr.^-i mi ,N-:;.••-. • -n-:: _^  ^ ,, prison a; .i.s. 
Rather, the trial court improperly cited to how imprisoning Ms. Johnson for a long time 
"would give her a place to live" and that Ms. Evans, whom had offered Ms. Johnson a 
l-..u * ; ^ ;. : . : \^nhhu ir: :i:c next crime."" I here is no evidence 
in the record to support the trial court's assertions regarding \U ! \ M< - \ ' • * * . - - -
the trial court the following letter. 
My name is Ruth Evans, my husband is Roger Evans, we are living in 
Mapleton, Utah. We have know[n] Mary Jean Johnson for five years. She 
and my son John M. Bay son were living in our house for some time. Now, 
I'm 68 years old and I'm sick. So, if she wants to come to oi lr house, she's 
very welcome and very greatfull [sic]. 
R.123. 
rn-.> rvvvjnU'!hv'vr' • . .U . IA: : . M . - : •vL'.-i *.\ans which 
stated in part: 
Mr. Evans said he's not real excited about her living with him and his wife, 
but realizes she has no where else to go, so they would allow her to stay 
' "h them temporarily (two or three weeks), while she finds employment 
a place of her ov m, 
13 
R. 123:11. 
The circumstances surrounding the offenses Ms. Johnson was convicted of do not 
evidence victims who are particularly vulnerable due to age or health as the trial court's 
comment would allude.2 In fact, the letter from Ms. Evans indicates that she has known 
Ms. Johnson for a long period of time and trusts her to come and live with her. R. 123. 
In addition, Ms. Evans does not live alone but with her husband who although not excited 
to have Ms. Johnson come and reside with them, was willing to offer her a temporary 
place to live and did not indicate that he was concerned that she would take advantage of 
them. R. 123:11. 
The trial court's reliance on improper factors in making its consecutive sentence 
decision is evidenced not only by its unsupported concerns about Ms. Johnson's potential 
residence but also by its statement that sending Ms. Johnson to prison for a long period of 
time would solve the problem of giving her a place to live. See Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. 
Furthermore, while the trial court did cite to Ms. Johnson's "accelerating" criminal 
history, it completely failed to explain why it was not only deviating from the 
recommendations of AP&P but deviating dramatically from probation to imposition of 
2
 The factual basis given during the entry of her guilty pleas was that she "cashed a check 
from Sonic Corporation which was unauthorized; and she was later discovered with other 
forged checks some from Wells Fargo Bank with the name of Jon Bayon on them. She 
was also in a vehicle with other Sonic Corporation checks containing her name on them." 
R. 116:5. In addition, "Ms. Johnson used a credit card of Paul Sagers [which was left in 
his pants when he dropped off his dry cleaning at a place Ms. Johnson worked] to make a 
purchase at Lowe's without his permission." R. 116:5; see also R. (686:9). 
14 
consec*i«\'* ^nlcHc;1-- Tn,M,>oMV. jV v \u:\ . . ; ir.^iiing ^nMs. 
Johnson's criminal record but ctnot explicitly address) ina! the presentence report's 
recommendation of [probation]" was an abuse of discretion. Perez, 2002 UT App 21 I at 
*||48. ' in :.:.-. . - .IL.»C : iH).I: J .^ iii this record to indicate that the trial court cconsider[ed] 
the . . .history, character, ;IM ' ~cb:\htth--*>-\r n-,^k -.f-:\: : •• . -. uv ;" ••^irrminnig 
whether to impose consecutive sentences.'" Id. This is especially important in light of the 
presentence report's explicit statement that it had come to its recommendation of 
probation after reviewing LM,. ^' \ci\ u... M S. Tl ins, the trial court's abuse of discretion in 
considering improper factors and failing to consider the ;•'* \**.^vy f;r^.v< v h.-- "n-- M.-,;n$_. 
consecutive sentences in this case resulted in a sentence that was clearly unfair and 
excessive given ihe circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 
three consecutive terms of zero to five years. 
SI 'BM1 IT HD mis __;_/ aa\ ot January; 2008. 
/ 
4~ 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
HEATHER CHESTNUT 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854, this ]*]* day of January, 2008. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
DELIVERED this day of January, 2008. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAL^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MARY JEAN JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 0619 04 772 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: March 19, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: HALL, JEFFREY W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : SCOTT A WILSON 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 7 
Audio 
Tape Number: 64 Tape Count: 104 83 0 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/ 27/2 006 Guilty 
5. POSSESS FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty Disposition: 11/27/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESS FORGERY 
WRITING/DEVICE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County snentr : The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation tn UIP Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 061904772 
Date: Mar 19, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison term is consecutive to case 051907686 and with each 
count. 
SENTENCE FINE 




Charge # 2 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $2150.00 
Total Principal Due: $4650.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Board of 
Pardons. 
Dated this &A day of (_ L\fLL(M^_ , 2 0 & T 
STEPHEN L HENRIOD <^V / 
Dj^trict Court Judge ///fy\, 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION dF'JUDC! 
Page 2 (last) 
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GRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintii f f , 
MARY JEAN JOHNSON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
1
 u ' • H" ' . "'I* I ->" ,'68 6 E S 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Datei March 19, 2 0 0 7 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: HALL, JEFFRE ¥ W 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 7, 10 7 0 
Audio 
Tape Number: 64 Tape Count: 104835 
CHARGES 
] FALSELY MAKE/CODE/SIGN FINANCIAL TRANS "2 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty Disposition: 11/2 7/2 006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's coi ivictioi i of FALSELY MAKE/CODE/SIGN 
FINANCIAL TRANS C a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
\'A 
Case No: 051907686 
Date: Mar 19, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This prison term is consecutive to case 061904772 
SENTENCE FINE 







Total Principal Due 






Dated this day of 
STEMEN tf-'HENM-qPi.lf. % 
District tebvF-1*' " ^ ^ ^ 
Page 2 (last) iT^r 
TabB 
t " .h <YA> ' ~.v; :.•' .*v 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrents • >: ^ n^vrt ; \ . ; : .». !< 
a n d 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run conseciitively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1 -401 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed m«v nn< <>\*rced 30 venrs imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
